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CLIMATE OF CONFUSION: CLIMATE CHANGE 
LITIGATION IN THE WAKE OF AMERICAN 
ELECTRIC POWER V. CONNECTICUT 
James Flynn* 
 
“Global warming is unequivocal and primarily human-induced.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The above quote, the first key finding in the executive summary of 
the U.S. Global Change Research Program’s report on climate 
change impacts in the United States,2 reflects the clear consensus 
view of climate researchers3 about climate change.4 The climate is 
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 1. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 12 (Thomas R. Karl et al. eds., 2009). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Peter T. Doran & Maggie Kendall Zimmerman, Examining the Scientific Consensus on 
Climate Change, EOS, TRANSACTIONS, AM. GEOPHYSICAL UNION, Jan. 20, 2009, at 22 (noting that over 
97% of climate experts surveyed believe that “human activity is a significant contributing factor in 
changing mean global temperatures”); see also William R. L. Anderegg et al., Expert Credibility in 
Climate Change, 107 PNAS 12107, 12107 (2010) (“(i) 97–98% of the climate researchers most actively 
publishing in the field support the tenets of ACC [Anthropogenic Climate Change] outlined by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and (ii) the relative climate expertise and scientific 
prominence of the researchers unconvinced of ACC are substantially below that of the convinced 
researchers.”); Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCIENCE 1686, 1686 
(2004) (finding that of 928 scientific abstracts surveyed that featured the key words “climate change,” 
none disputed the consensus position). Additionally, many major national academies of science support 
the position, including the National Academy of Science (United States), the Royal Society (United 
Kingdom), the Royal Society of Canada, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Network of African Science 
Academies, and the Science Council of Japan. Is There a Scientific Consensus on Global Warming?, 
SKEPTICAL SCI., http://www.skepticalscience.com/global-warming-scientific-consensus-intermediate 
.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2011). Finally, most major American scientific bodies support the position, 
including the American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Astronomical Society, 
American Chemical Society, American Geophysical Union, American Institute of Physics, American 
Meteorological Society, American Physical Society, the National Center for Atmospheric Research, and 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Id. While some contest a consensus, their views 
rarely withstand scrutiny. Compare GLOBAL WARMING PETITION PROJECT, 
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changing, humans are the primary cause, and without significant 
actions to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, the world faces 
potentially catastrophic long-term consequences.5 Potential and 
observed consequences include sea level rise,6 increases in both 
drought and flooding,7 the melting of Arctic sea ice,8 greater 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.petitionproject.org/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2012) (asserting that many scientists dispute the 
consensus on global warming), with H. Josef Hebert, Jokers Add Fake Names to Warming Petition, 
SEATTLE TIMES (May 1, 1998, 12:00 AM), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date 
=19980501&slug=2748308 (noting the Oregon Petition at times contained many fake names, including 
Perry S. Mason and Robert C. Byrd, the fictitious lawyer and real-life Senator, respectively, as well as 
Dr. Ginger Geri Halliwell, a.k.a. Ginger Spice), and Kevin Grandia, The 30,000 Global Warming 
Petition Is Easily-Debunked Propaganda, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2009, 4:47 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-grandia/the-30000-global-warming_b_243092.html (noting that 
the Oregon Petition contains few practicing climate scientists and many unverifiable credentials). While 
some fake names have subsequently been removed, both Mason and Byrd, at least, are still listed on the 
Oregon Petition. See GLOBAL WARMING PETITION PROJECT, supra. 
 4. In this Comment, I will use the terms climate change, anthropogenic (caused or produced by 
humans) climate change, and global warming interchangeably, even though climate change and global 
warming are not inherently synonymous and the climate may change in response to many mechanisms 
other than human-induced global warming. For the purposes of this Comment, the terms refer to the 
phenomenon whereby humans add greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide and methane to the 
atmosphere, the additional gases prevent more of the sun’s energy from reflecting back into space, and 
the Earth warms and the climate changes in response. How Do We Know More CO2 is Causing 
Warming?, SKEPTICAL SCI., supra note 3. For a far more thorough and detailed explanation of the 
phenomenon and the history of scientific understanding on the topic, see Hervé Le Treut et al., 
Historical Overview of Climate Change Science, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE 
BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ch. 1 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007); Spencer 
Weart & Am. Inst. Physics, Introduction: A Hyperlinked History of Climate Change Science, 
DISCOVERY OF GLOBAL WARMING (May 2010), http://www.aip.org/history/climate/summary.htm. 
 5. See IAN ALLISON ET AL., UNIV. OF NEW S. WALES CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH CTR., THE 
COPENHAGEN DIAGNOSIS, 2009: UPDATING THE WORLD ON THE LATEST CLIMATE SCIENCE 7 (2009) 
(“Delay in action risks irreversible damage . . . . The turning point must come soon . . . .”). 
 6. Id. (“By 2100, global sea-level is likely to rise at least twice as much as projected by Working 
Group 1 of the IPCC AR4 . . . .”); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 150 
(“[R]ecent estimates of global sea-level rise substantially exceed the IPCC estimates, suggesting sea-
level rise between 3 and 4 feet in this century.”). 
 7. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 15 (“Anthropogenic climate change is expected to lead to 
further increases in precipitation extremes, both increases in heavy precipitation and increases in 
drought.”); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 33 (“In the future, droughts 
are likely to become more frequent and severe in some regions.”); id. at 64 (“Such intense precipitation 
is likely to increase the frequency and severity of events such as the Great Flood of 1993.”). 
 8. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (“Summer-time melting of Arctic sea-ice has accelerated far 
beyond the expectations of climate models.”); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 
1, at 39 (“Arctic sea ice is declining rapidly and this is very likely to continue.”). Indeed, in September 
2012, summer arctic sea ice set records for lowest recorded minimum extent and volume in the satellite 
record. See Ramez Naam, Arctic Sea Ice: What, Why and What Next, SCI. AM. BLOG (Sept. 21, 2012), 
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/2012/09/21/arctic-sea-ice-what-why-and-what-next/; see 
also Arctic Sea Ice Extent Settles at Record Seasonal Minimum, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR. (Sept. 
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occurrences of extreme weather events,9 glacial melting,10 ocean 
acidification,11 and the triggering of feedbacks that will dramatically 
increase warming.12 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) released its Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC AR4) in 2007, 
a massive document that synthesized the research on climate 
change.13 Since the release of that report, newer studies indicate that 
the IPCC AR4 underestimated the timing and scale of many of the 
possible impacts—some consequences are happening sooner than 
expected and many predictions for future consequences grow direr 
each year.14 
                                                                                                                 
19, 2012), http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2012/09/arctic-sea-ice-extent-settles-at-record-seasonal-
minimum/. 
 9. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 105 (“[F]uture increases in 
[insured] losses will be attributable to climate change as it increases the frequency and intensity of many 
types of extreme weather, such as severe thunderstorms and heat waves.”). These extreme events also 
include “more frequent hot days, hot nights and heat waves; fewer cold days, cold nights and frosts; 
more frequent heavy precipitation events; more intense and longer droughts over wider areas; and an 
increase in intense tropical cyclone activity in the North Atlantic but no trend in total numbers of 
tropical cyclones.” ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 15. 
 10. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 23 (“These new assessments . . . show glacier and ice cap 
contributions to sea level rise that are generally slightly higher than those reported in IPCC AR4.”). 
 11. Id. at 36 (“The increase in ocean CO2 has caused a direct decrease in surface ocean pH by an 
average of 0.1 units since 1750 and an increase in acidity by more than 30%.”). Ocean acidification 
results not from the increase in temperature caused by global warming, but from the increase in carbon 
dioxide the oceans absorb, and it alone represents a potentially catastrophic consequence. U.S. GLOBAL 
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 151–52 (“In addition to carbon dioxide’s heat-trapping 
effect, the increase in its concentration in the atmosphere is gradually acidifying the ocean. . . . As a 
result of these and other stresses, the corals that form the reefs in the Florida Keys, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, 
and the Pacific Islands are projected to be lost if carbon dioxide concentrations continue to rise at their 
current rate.”). 
 12. Climate feedbacks are processes that either amplify or lessen the climate’s response to stimuli. 
Sandrine Bony et al., How Well Do We Understand and Evaluate Climate Change Feedback 
Processes?, 19 J. CLIMATE 3445, 3445 (2006). Global warming feedbacks include: the melting of Arctic 
sea ice, which decreases the Earth’s albedo (reflectivity) and causes more energy to be absorbed into the 
oceans, which in turn contributes to more melting sea ice; increases in water vapor in the atmosphere; 
and the melting of the arctic permafrost, releasing massive amounts of stored carbon dioxide and 
potentially methane. JOSEPH ROMM, HELL AND HIGH WATER: GLOBAL WARMING—THE SOLUTION AND 
THE POLITICS—AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO 17–18 (2007). For further discussion of feedbacks 
associated with global warming, see ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 14, 22–23, 44, 49; Bony et al., 
supra at 3445. For more information on the permafrost feedback, see Methane Releases from Arctic 
Shelf May Be Much Larger and Faster than Anticipated, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Mar. 4, 2010), 
http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=116532&org=NSF&from=news. 
 13. The entire report can be downloaded piecemeal at INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2012). 
 14. See generally ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra 
note 1; see also Julienne Stroeve et al., Arctic Sea Ice Decline: Faster Than Forecast, 34 GEOPHYSICAL 
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While the scientific understanding of climate change has solidified 
substantially in the past two decades, national governments have 
taken little significant action to combat the problem, particularly the 
United States.15 The United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol16 
and has yet to pass any new legislation that would establish 
significant reductions in emissions from stationary sources17 or set a 
price on carbon, either through a tax or cap-and-trade system.18 
                                                                                                                 
RES. LETTERS L09501 (2007); Neven, Models Are Improving, But Can They Catch Up?, ARCTIC SEA 
ICE BLOG (Sept. 17, 2012), http://neven1.typepad.com/blog/2012/09/models-are-improving-but-can-
they-catch-up.html (discussing the Stroeve article, supra, and updating its graph with data from the past 
five years). 
 15. See Ken Alex, A Period of Consequences: Global Warming as Public Nuisance, 43A STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 77, 82–84 (2007). 
 16. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Climate Change Treaty, to Go Beyond the Kyoto Protocol, Is Expected by 
the Year’s End, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2009, at A5, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/13/science/earth/13climate.html. 
 17. See Alex, supra note 15, at 82–84. The Obama administration did pass new emissions standards 
for light vehicles and trucks. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
85, 86 & 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537 & 538). Additionally, the EPA issued a Tailoring 
Rule that implements a permitting program that subjects the largest stationary emitters of greenhouse 
gases to permitting requirements under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V 
sections of the Clean Air Act. Action to Ensure Authority to Implement Title V Permitting Programs 
Under the Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,254 (Dec. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 52 & 70). However, the PSD requirements only apply to new major stationary sources, or 
stationary sources undergoing modifications leading to significant emissions increases. Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration of Air Quality, 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(49)(iv)–(v) (2012). Similarly, the new 
emissions standards promulgated by the EPA only apply to light-duty vehicles such as cars and light 
trucks, and not to heavy trucks or other large transportation vehicles. See Light-Duty Vehicle 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
25,329–30. While these are laudable achievements, they fall far short of the efforts scientists say are 
needed to combat climate change. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (noting that emissions must 
peak by 2020 and then rapidly decline in order to limit impacts of global warming). In the Carbon 
Mitigation Initiative’s strategy to combat global warming, for instance, efficiency satisfies only one of 
the fifteen “wedges” needed to stabilize the atmosphere onto a “safer course,” and increasing the fuel 
efficiency of cars to sixty miles-per-gallon is only one part of total efficiency efforts needed to meet that 
wedge. Stabilization Wedges Introduction: Building the Stabilization Triangle, CARBON MITIGATION 
INITIATIVE, PRINCETON U., http://cmi.princeton.edu/wedges/intro.php (last updated July 27, 2011); see 
also Big Picture Solutions, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/so 
lutions/big_picture_solutions/big-picture-solutions.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). 
 18. For an explanation of cap-and-trade, see Cap and Trade 101: What is Cap and Trade, and How 
Can We Implement it Successfully?, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 16, 2008), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/01/capandtrade101.html. For an explanation of a carbon 
tax, see Introduction: What’s a Carbon Tax?, CARBON TAX CENTER, 
http://www.carbontax.org/introduction/ (last updated Dec. 12, 2012). For an economic analysis of 
passing such measures, see generally Paul Krugman, Building a Green Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 
2010, at MM34, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/magazine/11Economy-
t.html?pagewanted=all. 
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Indeed, many politicians and media members resist even admitting 
that a problem exists.19 Using tactics taken from the Big Tobacco 
playbook of decades past, some politicians, fossil fuel trade groups, 
and think tanks have sought to obfuscate the issue in the hopes of 
delaying action.20 
Despite minimal federal action on climate change and denial of the 
issue by some, the problem persists.21 Scientists are already detecting 
impacts of climate change both globally and specifically in the 
United States.22 Tired of waiting for federal action, individual states, 
advocacy groups, and private parties sought new channels to combat 
anthropogenic climate change.23 Beginning in the 2000s, advocates 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Senator James Inhofe of Oklahoma famously called global warming “the greatest hoax ever 
perpetrated on the American people.” 151 CONG. REC. S18 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 2005) (statement of Senator 
James Inhofe). Former Fox News personality Glenn Beck called it the “discredited global warming 
scam.” Glenn Beck: Global Warming’s Real Inconvenient Truth, GLENN BECK (Dec. 15, 2009, 2:59 
AM), http://www.glennbeck.com/content/articles/article/198/34222/. Governor Rick Perry of Texas, a 
2012 presidential candidate, argues that scientists manipulate data for money and claims that scientists 
are coming forward every day questioning global warming. Glen Kessler, Rick Perry’s Made-Up 
“Facts” About Global Warming, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2011, at A02. 
 20. Primarily, the tactics involve overstating scientific uncertainty to create the illusion of a genuine 
scientific debate. NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF 
SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 5–9 
(2010). For a thorough discussion of the similarity in both the tactics and persons denying the dangers of 
tobacco and climate change, see id. For thorough discussions of how industry groups, think tanks, the 
media and politicians have obfuscated the issues surrounding climate change, see generally JAMES 
HOGGAN & RICHARD LITTLEMORE, CLIMATE COVER-UP: THE CRUSADE TO DENY GLOBAL WARMING 
(2009) and JAMES LAWRENCE POWELL, THE INQUISITION OF CLIMATE SCIENCE (2011). 
 21. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 9 (“Climate-related changes have 
already been observed globally and in the United States.”). 
 22. Id. (noting climate-related changes have been observed in the United States and globally). 
Scientists are less certain about how much of any particular weather event is attributable to a warming 
climate, and some scientists refer to “loaded dice” or “loading the dice” when discussing climate 
change’s impact on individual weather events. See Jeff Masters, Jeff Masters’ WunderBlog: At least 611 
Dead in Brazilian Floods: Brazil’s Deadliest Natural Disaster in History, WUNDERGROUND.COM (Jan. 
14, 2011, 5:05 PM), http://www.wunderground.com/blog/JeffMasters/comment.html?entrynum=1727 
(noting that increased ocean temperatures make extreme rainfall events more likely); Andrew C. 
Revkin, NASA’s Hansen: Humans Still Loading Climate Dice, N.Y. TIMES BLOGS, DOT EARTH (June 
23, 2008, 12:24 AM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/nasas-hansen-humans-still-loading-
climate-dice/. 
 23. See Morgan McCue Sport, Comment, An Inconvenient Suit: California v. General Motors 
Corporation and a Look at Whether Global Warming Constitutes an Actionable Public Nuisance or a 
Nonjusticiable Political Question, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 583, 586 (2008) (“As a result of the Bush 
administration’s apparent unwillingness to address global climate change, many are now beginning to 
utilize the judicial system as a means of solving these environmental problems.”). Individuals and 
advocacy groups were not the only actors in this new movement; states individually began taking action. 
Alex, supra note 15, at 83–84 (noting that states have begun taking action in the absence of federal 
5
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and states turned their focus to the judicial branch and began bringing 
climate change claims in courts.24 Some of these new lawsuits 
challenged the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases,25 others sought 
recovery for existing or future damages from climate change,26 while 
still others attempted to impose judicially mandated limits on 
greenhouse gas emissions.27 
In 2011, American Electric Power v. Connecticut, a global 
warming public nuisance suit, reached the Supreme Court.28 In a 
unanimous decision,29 the Court held that the Clean Air Act (CAA) 
and the EPA action it authorized “displace any federal common law 
right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel 
fired power plants.”30 The Court’s decision left the CAA as the sole 
means of setting emissions limits for fossil-fuel-fired power plants.31 
This Comment addresses the state of climate change litigation in 
the wake of this important case. Part I examines the litigation leading 
to American Electric, beginning with the interstate nuisance cases of 
the twentieth century that established the federal common law, 
through the most recent and relevant climate change cases.32 Part II 
discusses American Electric and then analyzes the decision and the 
Court’s reasoning, suggesting that the Court reached the correct 
                                                                                                                 
action). For instance, California was the first state to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from cars. See 
Rachel L. Chanin, Note, California’s Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 
58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 699, 699 (2003). It was also the first state to pass comprehensive 
greenhouse gas regulations. See California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West 2012); Sport, supra, at 609 (“[T]he State of California adopted 
the nation’s first global warming regulations requiring major greenhouse gas producers to substantially 
curb their greenhouse gas emissions.”). 
 24. See generally Jeremy Hessler, Note, A Temporary Solution to Climate Change: The Federal 
Common Law to the Rescue?, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 407 (2011). 
 25. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), discussed infra Part I.C.2. 
 26. See, e.g., California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 17, 2007), discussed infra Part.I.C.1.c. 
 27. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
 28. Id. In the case, several states, New York City, and private land-trusts sought an injunction 
against five electric utilities. Id. at 2532. The plaintiffs sought a judicially imposed limit on annual 
greenhouse gas emissions from the utilities. Id. 
 29. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the decision. Id. at 2540. 
 30. Id. at 2537. 
 31. Id. at 2538. 
 32. See discussion infra Part I. 
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answer, but used unnecessary language to do so.33 Additionally, Part 
II explores questions left unanswered by the Court.34 Part III 
examines litigation tactics still available to advocates of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions after American Electric, and suggests that 
litigation is still a vital tool in fighting global warming.35 
I. FROM GEORGIA TO CONNECTICUT: HOW CLIMATE CHANGE 
BECAME A NUISANCE 
A. Georgia And Illinois Create Federal Common Law 
In 1907, the Supreme Court “implicitly created the federal 
common law of nuisance.”36 The Court, in Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper Co., held that a state, “in its capacity of quasi-sovereign,” 
may bring an action seeking abatement of or payment for interstate 
pollution.37 In language since quoted many times, Justice Holmes 
noted that states have a right to protect their air, lands, and populace: 
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign 
that the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great 
scale by sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains, be 
they better or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they 
have suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by 
the act of persons beyond its control, that the crops and orchards 
on its hills should not be endangered from the same source.38 
Justice Holmes was wary, however, that “peculiarities necessarily 
mark” such suits39: notably, states are likely to seek abatement as 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See discussion infra Part II.A–B. 
 34. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 35. See discussion infra Part III. 
 36. Hessler, supra note 24, at 417. 
 37. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (“[I]t is plain that some such demands 
must be recognized, if the grounds alleged are proved . . . . [T]he alternative . . . is a suit in this court.”); 
see also Hessler, supra note 24, at 417 (“The Court held that a state may use federal courts in order to 
receive injunctive relief against transboundary polluters in other states, and thus created the cause of 
action.”). 
 38. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 238. 
 39. Id. at 237. 
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opposed to money damages, as the intrinsic value of lands, air, and 
health is difficult to assess.40 While the Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins famously pronounced “[t]here is no federal general 
common law,”41 there are exceptions, and Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper Co. is the foundation of one such exception.42 
That exception was expanded post-Erie in the seminal 
environmental case Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I).43 While 
Georgia concerned interstate air pollution, Milwaukee I dealt with 
interstate water pollution.44 In Milwaukee I, the State of Illinois 
sought leave to file suit under the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction against four Wisconsin cities and two local sewerage 
commissions for dumping sewage into Lake Michigan.45 The Court 
noted the similarities in its treatment of interstate air and water 
pollution,46 and Justice Douglas plainly stated, “[w]hen we deal with 
air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal 
common law.”47 In a prescient moment, however, he noted, “[i]t may 
happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in 
time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance.”48 The 
Court then held that interstate water pollution cases arising under 
federal law may be brought in a federal district court and may be 
initiated by states.49 In so doing, the Court established what has been 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. (noting that states may be more entitled to an injunction than a private party). 
 41. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 42. See Alex, supra note 15, at 85 (“The clear implication of the Court’s more recent rulings is that 
Tennessee Copper is as valid today as it was in 1907.”). 
 43. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wis. (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91 (1972); see Matthew F. Pawa & 
Benjamin A. Krass, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance: Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 16 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 430 (2005) (noting that Milwaukee I is “the leading Supreme Court case 
on the federal common law of public nuisance”). 
 44. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 93. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 105 (“Our decisions concerning interstate waters contain the same theme [as found in 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.].”). 
 47. Id. at 103. 
 48. Id. at 107. 
 49. Id. at 99 (“The question is whether pollution of interstate or navigable waters creates actions 
arising under the ‘laws’ of the United States within the meaning of [§] 1331(a). We hold that it does; 
and we also hold that [§] 1331(a) includes suits brought by a State.”). 
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called “the modern framework for the federal common law of public 
nuisance.”50 
B. Milwaukee II Introduces Displacement 
Justice Douglas’s observation in Milwaukee I, that federal laws 
might displace some federal common law claims of nuisance, came 
to fruition nine years later in Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II).51 
In the interim between the Milwaukee I and II, Congress enacted 
legislation that would later become the Clean Water Act (CWA).52 In 
Milwaukee II, Justice Rehnquist first noted that federal common law 
is displaced when Congress not only speaks directly on the issue,53 
but when it “occupie[s] the field.”54 He further noted that unlike 
preemption of state law, displacement of federal common law did not 
require a “clear and manifest purpose” by Congress.55 Finally, the 
Court held that Congress, through its 1972 amendments, had not only 
spoken directly on the issue,56 but had occupied the field with “a 
comprehensive regulatory program,”57 and thus Illinois no longer had 
a federal common-law remedy.58 Milwaukee I clarified when 
interstate pollution qualified as a federal common law nuisance,59 
while Milwaukee II demonstrated that such federal common law is 
displaced when federal law occupies that particular field.60 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Pawa & Krass, supra note 43, at 440. 
 51. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
 52. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). Though the foundation 
for the Clean Water Act was laid with the 1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, “sweeping 
amendments” were made in 1972. History of the Clean Water Act, EPA.GOV, 
http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/cwahistory.html (last updated Aug. 23, 2012). Further amendments 
and an official name change to the Clean Water Act came in 1977. Id. 
 53. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314 (“[W]hen Congress addresses a question previously governed by a 
decision rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal 
courts disappears.”). 
 54. Id. at 317. 
 55. Id. (“‘[W]e start with the assumption’ that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the 
appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law.” (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 
U.S. 519, 525 (1977))). 
 56. Id. at 325–26 (noting the CWA affords States “ample opportunity” to challenge the permitting 
decisions of neighboring States). 
 57. Id. at 317. 
 58. Id. at 332. 
 59. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972). 
 60. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 332. 
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C. The Modern Climate Change Cases 
The major modern climate change cases generally fall into two 
categories. First are the nuisance-based claims that seek either 
greenhouse-gas limits from various sources, or money damages from 
major greenhouse-gas emitters.61 Second are regulatory challenges—
to the EPA and other federal agencies—that seek to regulate 
greenhouse gases, or ensure that federal actions account for climate 
change.62 The cases discussed below were all filed after the initial 
American Electric claims were filed,63 but most were decided before 
American Electric reached the Supreme Court.64 
1. Nuisance-Based Claims 
While Milwaukee I and II laid the foundations of federal common 
law nuisance and displacement principles, they were confined to 
instances of water pollution.65 The CWA specifically provides means 
for states to address interstate water pollution,66 and as a 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, 598 
F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), vacated, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Native Vill. of 
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 
2012); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 
2007). For a thorough examination and categorization of climate change litigation, see generally David 
Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence 
or Business As Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15 (2012). 
 62.  See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Korsinsky v. EPA, No. 05 Civ. 
859(NRB), 2005 WL 2414744 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005). 
 63. The original American Electric complaints were filed in 2004. Complaint, Connecticut v. Am. 
Elec. Power Co. (Connecticut I), 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 
2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 04 Civ. 5669(LAP)), 
2004 WL 5614397; Complaint, Connecticut I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 
309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 04 Civ. 
5670(LAP)), 2004 WL 5614409. 
 64. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in American Electric in December 2010. Am. Elec. Power 
Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010). 
 65. Both cases focused on the dumping of pollutants into Lake Michigan. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 
304 (1981); Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
 66. For instance, the CWA requires that states that may be affected by pending permits for discharge 
of water pollutants receive notice and have a right to comment in public hearings and submit written 
recommendations to the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3) (2006). Based on the hearings, written 
recommendations, and the EPA’s discretion, the EPA may veto permits. See id. § 1342(d)(2); see also 
Alex, supra note 15, at 88 (“[T]he amended Clean Water Act allowed Illinois to participate in the permit 
issuing process, so it was not left without a federal forum in which to protect its interests in clean 
water.”). Additionally, state governors may initiate citizen suits against other states for violating 
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comprehensive regulatory regime, it occupies the field of interstate 
water pollution.67 The CAA,68 on the other hand, only covers certain 
discharges to the air from certain sources.69 Thus, it was not clear 
whether the CAA would displace climate change actions based on 
common law nuisance claims in the same way that the CWA had 
preempted interstate water pollution claims,70 and climate change 
nuisance claims began appearing in federal courts. 
a. The Strange Case of Comer 
In Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, residents and landowners of the 
Gulf Coast brought an action in the Southern District of Mississippi 
against several oil companies in 2007.71 While the plaintiffs did not 
raise any federal causes of action, they did bring state claims of 
public and private nuisance.72 Plaintiffs—residents of the Gulf Coast 
who were reeling from the devastation wrought by Hurricane 
Katrina—argued that the defendants’ emissions of greenhouse gases 
contributed to global warming, which increased the intensity of the 
hurricane73 and led to the destruction of their private property and 
                                                                                                                 
emissions standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1365. States may also, through citizen suits, sue the EPA administrator 
for failure to perform any non-discretionary acts under the CWA. Id. 
 67. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317. 
 68. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified generally as 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671). 
 69. See Alex, supra note 15, at 89 (“[T]he Clean Air Act regulates only a defined body of pollutants 
emitted from specified sources.”). The CAA regulates only those pollutants that the EPA administrator 
deems a threat to public health and welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A). The CWA, on the other hand, 
regulates, with exceptions, the discharge of any pollutant from any point source. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 
 70. Pawa and Krass boldly stated in 2005, “there is no preemption.” Pawa & Krass, supra note 43, at 
463. This proclamation was made before the Supreme Court ruled that carbon dioxide was a pollutant in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, so Pawa and Krass’s analysis may have been correct. Indeed, even after 
Massachusetts, the Second Circuit held in Connecticut v. American Electric that such claims were not 
displaced. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Connecticut II), 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
 71. Named defendants included ExxonMobil Corp., Shell Oil Co., and Murphy Oil USA, among 
others. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 858 (5th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, 598 F.3d 
208 (5th Cir. 2010), vacated, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 72. The plaintiffs also brought claims of “trespass, negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy.” Id. at 859–60. 
 73. Research on the link between climate change and hurricanes is still inconclusive; however, early 
results indicate that while the rates of Atlantic hurricanes may or may not decrease due to climate 
change, the hurricanes that do form have a greater chance of intensifying into more destructive storms 
due to higher sea levels and greater sea surface temperatures. See LENNY BERNSTEIN ET AL., 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 46 
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“public property useful to them.”74 They sought both compensatory 
and punitive damages, but not abatement.75 The district court 
dismissed the claims, holding the plaintiffs did not have standing and 
the claims represented nonjusticiable political questions.76 The Fifth 
Circuit initially reversed the district court, holding the plaintiffs had 
standing to bring their nuisance claims and such claims were not 
barred by the political question doctrine.77 On a rehearing en banc, 
however, the Fifth Circuit lost a justice to recusal and thus its 
quorum.78 Lacking a quorum, it did not have the power to offer an 
opinion79 and dismissed the appeal.80 Instead of contributing a circuit 
opinion on the political question doctrine and standing in state law 
global warming cases, the Fifth Circuit provided only uncertainty. 
b. California Scheming 
In the 2006 case, California v. General Motors, the state brought 
an action against the six largest automobile manufacturers in the 
                                                                                                                 
(Abdelkader Allali et al. eds., 2007) (“Based on a range of models, it is likely that future tropical 
cyclones (typhoons and hurricanes) will become more intense . . . . There is less confidence in 
projections of a global decrease in numbers of tropical cyclones.”); James B. Elsner et al., The 
Increasing Intensity of the Strongest Tropical Cyclones, 455 NATURE 92, 92 (2008) (“Atlantic tropical 
cyclones are getting stronger on average . . . .”); Gabriele Villarini et al., North Atlantic Tropical Storm 
Frequency Response to Anthropogenic Forcing: Projections and Sources of Uncertainty, 24 J. CLIMATE 
3224, 3235 (2011) (“The disagreement among published results concerning increasing or decreasing 
North Atlantic tropical storm trends in a warmer climate can be largely explained (close to half of the 
variance) in terms of the different sea surface temperature projections (Atlantic minus tropical mean) of 
the different climate model projections used.”). 
 74. Comer, 585 F.3d at 859. 
 75. See Sport, supra note 23, at 604. 
 76. Comer, 585 F.3d at 860. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 79. Id. at 1055. The court noted that the grant of rehearing vacated the previous opinion. Id. at 1053. 
 80. Id. at 1056. The court helpfully noted, however, that “[t]he parties, of course, now have the right 
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id. at 1055. The dissenting judge, W. Eugene Davis, 
found “an inexplicable disconnect between the notion that a majority of the eight unrecused judges has 
no authority to do anything except literally apply our Local Rule 41.3 strictly as written; yet they do 
have the authority to dismiss the appeal.” Id. at 1056 (Davis, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court 
subsequently denied the plaintiffs’ petition for mandamus to reinstate their appeal. In re Comer, 131 S. 
Ct. 902 (2011). The plaintiffs filed suit again in the Southern District of Mississippi in 2011. Comer v. 
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 854 (S.D. Miss. 2012). The court there found that 
plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, or in the alternative, that plaintiffs 
did not have standing to bring their claims and that such claims were barred by the political question 
doctrine. Id. at 868. 
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world, alleging the defendants’ products contributed to global 
warming.81 The state filed a public nuisance claim under federal 
common law, and in the alternative, a state-based public nuisance 
claim.82 Plaintiffs argued, among other things, that global warming is 
contributing to the loss of the Sierra snowpack—which threatens 
water supplies—while earlier melting of the snowpack in spring 
contributes to flooding.83 Additionally, they argued that rising sea 
levels pose a threat of greater erosion to California’s 1,075 miles of 
coastline.84 The state sought damages, not abatement,85 and also 
sought a declaratory judgment “for such future monetary expenses 
and damages as may be incurred by California in connection with the 
nuisance of global warming.”86 California argued that it was not 
asking the court to solve climate change, but merely seeking damages 
resulting from the defendants’ contributions to global warming.87 The 
court disagreed and reasoned that the case was barred by the political 
question doctrine.88 It noted that a “federal common law global 
warming nuisance tort would have an inextricable effect on interstate 
commerce and foreign policy—issues constitutionally committed to 
the political branches of government,”89 and dismissed the case.90 
The court’s holding thwarted California’s attempt to circumvent the 
political question doctrine by seeking only damages.91 While 
                                                                                                                 
 81. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
17, 2007). Included were General Motors, Daimler Chrysler, Toyota, Nissan, Ford and Honda. Alex, 
supra note 15, at 78 n.2. 
 82. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *2. 
 83. Sport, supra note 23, at 610. 
 84. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *1. 
 85. See id. at *14. 
 86. Second Amended Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Judgment at 14, California v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (No. C06-05755 
EMC), 2006 WL 3069165. 
 87. Randall S. Abate, Automobile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts: Employing Public 
Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a “Global Warming Solution” in California, 40 CONN. L. REV. 591, 597 
(2008). 
 88. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *12 (“Plaintiff’s current tort claim would require this 
Court to make the precise initial carbon dioxide policy determinations that should be made by the 
political branches . . . .”). 
 89. Id. at *14. 
 90. Id. at *17. 
 91. Abate, supra note 87, at 598. 
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providing more guidance than Comer, California still left 
unanswered how state law claims would fare.92 
c. Standing in Kivalina 
In 2009, the Village of Kivalina93 brought a federal common law 
claim of nuisance, as well as state law claims, in the Northern District 
of California.94 The plaintiffs named twenty-two defendants, 
including major oil and electric utility companies like ExxonMobil 
and American Electric Power Company.95 The complaint alleged that 
the defendants’ “excessive emission[s]” of greenhouse gases 
contributed to global warming and led to diminished Arctic sea ice—
which traditionally protected the village from winter storms—and as 
a result the village would have to be relocated.96 The Village asserted 
that by seeking damages instead of an injunction, it was not asking 
the court to decide what emissions limits “should have been 
imposed” on the defendants.97 The court did not find the damages-
only argument persuasive.98 Further, the court found that the Village 
could not be certain which emissions were directly responsible for 
                                                                                                                 
 92. After dismissing the federal claim, the court held it did not have supplemental jurisdiction over 
California’s state law claim, nor did it rule on whether the CAA would displace federal claims. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 at *16. 
 93. The Village of Kivalina is a “the governing body of an Inupiat Eskimo village of approximately 
400 people who reside in the City of Kivalina” in Alaska. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 
663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 94. Id. at 869. 
 95. Id. at 868 n.1 (“Defendants are: (1) ExxonMobil Corporation; (2) BP P.L.C.; (3) BP America, 
Inc.; (4) BP Products North America, Inc.; (5) Chevron Corporation; (6) Chevron U.S.A., Inc.; (7) 
ConocoPhilips Company; (8) Royal Dutch Shell P.L.C.; (9) Shell Oil Company; (10) Peabody Energy 
Corporation; (11) The AES Corporation; (12) American Electric Power Corporation; (13) American 
Electric Power Services Corporation; (14) DTE Energy Company; (15) Duke Energy Corporation; (16) 
Dynergy Holdings, Inc.; (17) Edison International; (18) MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company; (19) 
Mirant Corporation; (20) NRG Energy; (21) Pinnacle West Capital Corporation; (22) Reliant Energy, 
Inc.; (23) The Southern Company; and (24) Xcel Energy, Inc.”). 
 96. Id. at 868. The decline of summer Arctic sea ice has been called a “death spiral” by Mark 
Serreze, the director of the National Snow and Ice Data Center. See Peter Wadhams, Geoengineering 
May Be Our Best Chance to Save Sea Ice, SCI. AM., Dec. 2012, at 12, available at 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=geoengineering-last-chance-save-sea-ice. This death 
spiral was evident in the record-low summer sea ice extent and volume recorded in September 2012. See 
Naam, supra note 8. 
 97. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876. The village estimated the cost of moving at “$95 to 
$400 million.” Id. at 869. 
 98. Id. at 876 (noting that the village’s argument rested on “faulty logic”). 
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the injury.99 The court dismissed the federal claim, asserting that the 
plaintiffs failed to establish causation necessary for Article III 
standing and that the claim was barred by the political question 
doctrine.100 As in California, the court dismissed the state law claims 
without prejudice.101 
The decisions in the modern nuisance suits demonstrate the 
uncertainty litigants faced in bringing climate change nuisance suits 
before American Electric. Other litigants, however, were adopting 
another strategy: using regulatory appeals to spur federal action on 
climate change.102 
2. Regulatory Appeals: Massachusetts Challenges the EPA 
In 2005, twelve states, four local governments, and several 
environmental groups103 brought suit against the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) in the D.C. Circuit for its denial of a 
petition requesting it to regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA.104 
The EPA, along with ten intervening states and several trade 
organizations,105 argued that either it did not have the statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Id. at 881 (noting that emissions from various countries, emitted over decades, could be the 
particular cause of the village’s injury). 
 100. Id. at 882. The court held that the plaintiffs did not qualify for relaxed standing requirements 
based on “‘special solitude’ generally afforded to sovereigns.” Id. It found that the plaintiffs were “not 
seeking to enforce any procedural rights concerning an agency’s rulemaking authority,” nor were they 
able to rely on the “‘quasi sovereign interests’ referenced by the Supreme Court” in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Id. 
 101. Id. at 882–83. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal in 2012 and relied on the holding of 
American Electric. This affirmation is discussed in more detail in Part II.B.2.a. 
 102. For a list of the many global warming related statutory and regulatory challenges, see Michael B. 
Gerrard & J. Cullen Howe, Climate Change Litigation in the U.S., 2–12, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, 
http://www.climatecasechart.com (last updated Oct. 2, 2012). 
 103. The states bringing the suit were California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. at 505 n.2. The local governments were District of Columbia, American Samoa, New 
York City, and Baltimore. Id. at 505 n.3. The environmental groups were the Center for Biological 
Diversity, Center for Food Safety, Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental Advocates, 
Environmental Defense, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, International Center for Technology 
Assessment, National Environmental Trust, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Union of 
Concerned Scientists, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group. Id. at 505 n.4. 
 104. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 105. The intervening states were Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, 
South Dakota, Texas, and Utah. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 505 n.5. The trade groups were the 
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, National Automobile Dealers Association, Engine 
15
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authority to regulate the gases under the CAA,106 or if it did have the 
authority, it chose not to regulate those gases.107 The circuit court 
ruled that the EPA administrator properly exercised his discretion in 
denying the petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.108 The 
decision did not contain a definitive ruling on the standing of the 
plaintiffs.109 
The Supreme Court, noting the “the unusual importance” of global 
warming, granted certiorari.110 In a five-to-four decision, the Court 
held that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the claims,111 the CAA 
unambiguously authorized the regulation of greenhouse gases,112 the 
EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases,113 and that the 
EPA acted “arbitrarily” and “capriciously” in refusing to regulate the 
gases.114 Justice Stevens, in analyzing plaintiffs’ standing, held that 
states are to be afforded a “special solicitude” in protecting their 
quasi-sovereign interests.115 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens then 
proceeded to analyze the usual elements of Article III standing, 
including injury,116 causation,117 and redressability.118 After finding 
                                                                                                                 
Manufacturers Association, Truck Manufacturers Association, CO2 Litigation Group, and Utility Air 
Regulatory Group. Id. at 505 n.6. 
 106. Id. at 511–12 (“[The] EPA observed that Congress ‘was well aware of the global climate change 
issue when it last comprehensively amended the [Clean Air Act] in 1990,’ yet it declined to adopt a 
proposed amendment establishing binding emissions limitations.”). 
 107. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 53. 
 108. Id. at 58. 
 109. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 514 (noting the circuit judge proceeded on the merits because 
standing and merits were overlapping inquiries). 
 110. Id. at 506. 
 111. Id. at 501, 526. 
 112. Id. at 529 (“Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are without a doubt 
‘physical [and] chemical . . . substance[s] which [are] emitted into . . . the ambient air.’ The statute is 
unambiguous.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006))). 
 113. Id. at 532. 
 114. Id. at 534. 
 115. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520. Justice Stevens noted that having ceded certain 
sovereign prerogatives to the federal government, “Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, [and] it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or 
India . . . .” Id. at 519. The need to protect its quasi-sovereign interests, along with its “concomitant 
procedural right to challenge” agency action it believed to be arbitrary and capricious, combined to give 
Massachusetts a “special solicitude” in the standing analysis. Id. at 520. For a rebuttal of Justice 
Stevens’ standing reasoning, see Chief Justice Robert’s dissent. Id. at 536–49 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 116. Justice Stevens asserted that the state had suffered a particularized injury as the “rising seas have 
already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land.” Id. at 522. 
 117. The Court noted first that the EPA acknowledged the causal connection between greenhouse 
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standing, the Court determined that the “EPA can avoid taking 
further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not 
contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable 
explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to 
determine whether they do.”119 The Court then remanded the case for 
further proceedings,120 which resulted in a settlement agreement 
between the EPA and petitioners.121 Massachusetts did not clarify the 
uncertainties of the nuisance cases, but its effects were decisive in 
American Electric.122 
3. Where Are We? 
The global warming cases of the past decade demonstrate some of 
the issues that face courts attempting to wrestle with global warming 
suits, particularly when such suits are founded in common law 
nuisance claims. The Kivalina court held that the Village, not 
deserving the “special solicitude” granted to states acting as quasi-
sovereigns, lacked standing, and further, that the claim was barred by 
the political question doctrine.123 The California court held the 
claims barred by the political question doctrine,124 but skirted around 
the issue of standing.125 On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit in Comer 
                                                                                                                 
gases and global warming, but argued that its failure to regulate such gases was too insignificant a 
contributor to Massachusetts’s injury for causation to be established. Id. at 523. Justice Stevens 
countered that the U.S. transportation sector alone contributes 6% of greenhouse gas emissions, and to 
regulate those emissions would “hardly [be] a tentative step.” Id. at 524–25. 
 118. Here, Justice Stevens stated that the remedy from the Court need only reduce the injury, not 
eliminate all injury entirely. Id. at 525. He further noted that the risk of catastrophic consequences to 
Massachusetts “would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received the relief they seek.” Id. at 526. 
 119. Id. at 533. 
 120. Id. at 535. 
 121. Proposed Settlement Agreement, Clean Air Act Citizen Suit 75 Fed. Reg. 82,392 (Envtl. Prot. 
Agency Dec. 30, 2010) (notice) [hereinatfter Proposed Settlement Agreement]. 
 122. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
 123. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 882 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 
696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 124. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 17, 2007) (“Plaintiff’s current tort claim would require this Court to make the precise initial carbon 
dioxide policy determinations that should be made by the political branches . . . .”). 
 125. The court discussed standing in its analysis of the Massachusetts v. EPA decision, noting that 
Massachusetts granted a “special solicitude” to States seeking judicial review of federal agency action. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *10–12. The court clarified that—unlike Massachusetts—
California was not “an administrative challenge to an EPA’s decision, but rather as an interstate global 
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initially found that plaintiffs, a class of private citizens, had standing 
to bring their claims and that the political question doctrine did not 
bar their claims.126 With the strange dismissal after rehearing, 
however, those initial decisions were tossed aside, leaving the 
question of standing and political question unanswered in the Fifth 
Circuit.127 None of the cases rendered decisions on the state law 
claims.128 While all of those issues would indeed play a role in 
American Electric, it was Massachusetts—the case rooted in a 
procedural challenge—that would have the greatest impact on the 
American Electric decision. 
II. AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY V. CONNECTICUT 
A. A [Minor] Nuisance For The Supreme Court 
1. Connecticut Starts in New York 
In 2004, eight states and New York City129 filed a lawsuit in the 
Southern District of New York against six electric utilities, including 
the federally owned and operated Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA).130 Three non-profit land trusts, including the Audubon 
Society of New Hampshire, filed a separate but similar suit against 
the same utilities.131 The two suits were combined into Connecticut v. 
                                                                                                                 
warming damages tort claim,” without ever deciding whether the State actually had standing to bring 
such a claim. Id. at *12. 
 126. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, 598 F.3d 
208 (5th Cir. 2010), vacated, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 127. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1055 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 128. In General Motors Corp. and Kivalina, the court held that it could not exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim after dismissing the federal claims. ExxonMobil Corp., 
663 F. Supp. 2d at 882; Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *16. 
 129. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2533–34, 2533 n.3 (2011). The states were 
California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id. at 
2533 n.3. New Jersey and Wisconsin later dropped out of the litigation. Id. 
 130. The other defendants were American Electric Power Company, Inc., American Electric Power 
Service Corporation, Southern Company, Xcel Energy, and Cinergy Corporation. Connecticut II, 582 
F.3d 309, 316 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
Cinergy later merged into Duke Energy. Brief for the Petitioners at II, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. 
Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 10-174), 2011 WL 334707. 
 131. The other land trusts were the Open Space Institute, Inc. and the Open Space Conservancy, Inc. 
Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2533–34 & n.4; Joy C. Fuhr, Connecticut v. AEP: The New Normal?, 
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American Electric Power Co.132 The plaintiffs asserted that the 
utilities were the largest emitters of greenhouse gases in the United 
States, emitting up to “650 million tons of carbon dioxide each year,” 
contributing up to 10% of the country’s annual anthropogenic 
emissions.133 The complaint argued that the defendants were 
“substantial contributors to elevated levels of carbon dioxide and 
global warming.”134 The complaint further asserted that potential 
injuries to plaintiffs resulting from the defendants’ contributions of 
greenhouse gases included, inter alia, increased heat deaths, 
increased beach erosion, and accelerated sea level rise.135 
The plaintiffs brought two claims: first, a federal nuisance claim, 
and in the alternative, a state nuisance claim.136 Plaintiffs sought 
abatement of the public nuisance through an injunctive cap on carbon 
dioxide emissions levels emitted by the utilities, arguing that 
“monetary damages are inadequate to remedy the injuries.”137 In 
deciding the utilities’ motion to dismiss, the district court looked to 
Baker v. Carr138—a leading Supreme Court case on the political 
question doctrine—and its six situations “indicating the existence of 
                                                                                                                 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 2010, at 58, 58. 
 132. Connecticut I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
 133. Brief for Respondents Connecticut, New York, California, Iowa, Rhode Island, Vermont, and the 
City of New York at 4, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 10-174), 2011 
WL 915093, at *4. 
 134. Complaint at 1, Connecticut I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d 
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 104CV05669), 2004 
WL 5614397. 
 135. Id. at 1–2. The claim also alleged, inter alia, “increased ground-level smog . . . ; salinization of 
water supplies . . . ; reduction of the mountain snow pack in California . . . ; lowered Great Lakes water 
levels . . . ; more droughts and floods . . . ; and widespread loss of species and biodiversity . . . .” Id. 
 136. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2534. Under the state law claims, both the states and the land 
trusts pled special injuries. Id. The land trusts noted that they were owners of real properties with 
“unique ecological values” that were open to the public, and that, unless abated, global warming 
threatened to “diminish or destroy the essential ecological and aesthetic attributes of their properties.” 
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Private Plaintiffs’ 
Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted at 1, Connecticut I, 406 F. 
Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 
(2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 104CV05670), 2004 WL 5614418. The states pointed to the 
injuries and risk of injuries described in the text. Complaint, supra note 134 at 1–2. 
 137. Complaint, supra note 134, at 44. 
 138. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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a non-justiciable political question.”139 Focusing on the third Baker 
prong, the court held the case presented questions requiring “an 
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial 
discretion” and dismissed the case.140 
Before the case reached the Second Circuit on appeal in 2009,141 
the Supreme Court ruled on Massachusetts v. EPA, holding that the 
CAA authorized the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.142 
The Second Circuit in Connecticut thus was asked to decide: (1) 
whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the claims; (2) whether 
their claims were barred by the political question doctrine; (3) 
whether their claims were properly stated and governed by the 
federal common law of nuisance; and (4) whether the plaintiffs’ 
claims were now preempted by the CAA.143 The Second Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the case did not 
present a nonjusticiable political question144 and that the states 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Connecticut I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 
2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (“[1] a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an 
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a 
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of the government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.” (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–78 (2004))). 
 140. Id. at 274. 
 141. Connecticut II, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. 
Ct. 2527 (2011). 
 142. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007). 
 143. Connecticut II, 582 F.3d at 314–15. The court also ruled on TVA’s theory “that the complaints 
should be dismissed against it on the basis of the discretionary function exception.” Id. at 315. 
 144. Id. at 390. The Second Circuit first noted the Supreme Court’s analysis from Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
541 U.S. 267 (2004), holding that the Baker factors “‘are probably listed in descending order of both 
importance and certainty.’” Id. at 321. The Court then applied the Baker factors individually, paying 
special attention to the first three. Id. at 323–32. The Court found that plaintiffs were not “ask[ing] the 
court to fashion a comprehensive and far-reaching solution to global climate change, a task that arguably 
falls within the purview of the political branches,” but instead merely “seek[ing] to limit emissions from 
six domestic coal-fired electricity plants on the ground that such emissions constitute a public nuisance 
that they allege has caused, is causing, and will continue to cause them injury.” Id. at 325. Moreover, the 
Court found there were “judicially discoverable and manageable standards” for deciding the case and 
that “[f]ederal courts have long been up to the task of assessing complex scientific evidence in cases 
where the cause of action was based either upon the federal common law or upon a statute.” Id. at 329. 
Finally, the Court found that the case presented “ordinary tort” issues, and therefore, there was no need 
to make initial policy determinations not suited for judicial discretion. Id. at 331. For a thorough 
discussion of the political question doctrine and the Second Circuit’s analysis of it in this case, see 
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satisfied Article III standing by properly pleading parens patriae 
standing.145 Additionally, the Second Circuit found that New York 
City and the public trusts also had standing to bring the claims.146 
Finally, the Circuit held that the CAA did not displace the federal 
common law, as the EPA had not yet issued regulations concerning 
greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources.147 The Second 
Circuit found that the CAA did not speak directly on the issue, and 
thus plaintiffs’ claims were not displaced.148 Accordingly, the Circuit 
vacated the lower court’s ruling.149 
2. A Brief Response from the Supreme Court 
The utility companies appealed, asserting again that Connecticut 
and the other respondents lacked standing to bring their claims, that 
the claims were barred by the political question doctrine, and that the 
claims were displaced by the CAA.150 In December 2010, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.151 In the interim between the 
Second Circuit’s decision and the grant of certiorari, the EPA 
released its Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for 
greenhouse gases, which found that greenhouse gases were a threat to 
public health and welfare.152 As a result, the CAA mandated that the 
                                                                                                                 
generally Nathan Howe, The Political Question Doctrine’s Role in Climate Change Nuisance 
Litigation: Are Power Utilities the First of Many Casualties?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 
11229 (2010). 
 145. Connecticut II, 582 F.3d at 338 (noting that state interest in the physical and economic well-
being of citizens are “classic examples of a state’s quasi-sovereign interest.”). 
 146. Id. at 366–69. The court held that New York City, as a subdivision of a state, sufficiently pleaded 
injuries to general public rights, id. at 366, and that the public trusts were private entities functioning as 
public entities, and as such would suffer harms that were unique from other private landowners. Id. at 
368–69. 
 147. Id. at 387–88. The Second Circuit reasoned that until the EPA regulated greenhouse gas 
emissions from stationary sources, the court would be unable to determine whether the regulations 
spoke directly to the field of greenhouse gas emissions generated by utilities. Id. at 380–81. 
 148. Id. at 387–88. The Second Circuit noted that should the EPA regulate greenhouse gas emissions, 
claims similar to the plaintiffs’ may indeed face displacement. Id. 
 149. Id. at 393. 
 150. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at i, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) 
(No. 10-174), 2011 WL 1393804, at *i. 
 151. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010). 
 152. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of 
the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (finding that six greenhouse gases (carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, hexafluoride), when well mixed, 
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EPA issue regulations of greenhouse gases.153 The EPA responded 
with a Tailoring Rule,154 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions standards 
for light vehicles,155 and a rule regarding the prevention of serious 
deterioration (PSD) in air quality of certain areas.156 
American Electric was decided June 20, 2011. In contrast with the 
Second Circuit’s thorough opinion, the Court’s opinion was fairly 
short, spanning only eight pages.157 Justice Ginsburg disagreed with 
the Second Circuit’s opinion and held that Congress had indeed 
occupied the field through enacting the CAA, even before the EPA 
actually set emissions standards for major emitters.158 Congress 
delegated authority to the EPA to decide whether to regulate 
greenhouse gases, and Justice Ginsburg found that delegation—and 
not whether the EPA actually regulates greenhouse gases—
constituted occupying the field.159 Indeed, the Court noted that even 
if the EPA chose not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, federal 
common law claims of nuisance would not be the appropriate means 
                                                                                                                 
endanger the public health and public welfare of future generations). 
 153. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007). The EPA released its final rules for regulating 
greenhouse gases emitted from power plants in July 2012. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and 
Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule Step 3 and GHG Plantwide Applicability Limits, 77 Fed. Reg. 
41,051 (July 12, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). 
 154. Action to Ensure Authority to Implement Title V Permitting Programs Under the Greenhouse 
Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,254 (Dec. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52 & 70). This 
rule provides an “implementation strategy” for issuing federal permits to “major” stationary sources. Id. 
For other criteria pollutants, 100 tons-per-year (tpy) emissions will generally constitute a major source. 
Id. at 82,256. The Tailoring Rule raises that level to 100,000 tpy of greenhouse gas emissions. Id. 
 155. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86 & 600 and 49 
C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537 & 538). 
 156. Limitation of Approval of Prevention of Significant Deterioration Provisions Concerning 
Greenhouse Gas Emitting-Sources in State Implementation Plans, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,536 (Dec. 30, 2010) 
[hereinafter PSD Rule] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). Because the Tailoring Rule changed the 
limits for major sources of greenhouse gas emissions, the PSD rule limited the application of prevention 
of significant deterioration plans—in place before the Tailoring Rule—that addressed greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
 157. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2532–40. 
 158. Id. at 2538. 
 159. Id. at 2538–39. Professor Jonathan Adler notes that the displacement analysis was the “weakest 
and least convincing portion” of the Second Circuit’s opinion, as it ignored the clear language of 
Milwaukee II that suggested that displacement of interstate nuisance claims depend merely on legislative 
action. Jonathan H. Adler, A Tale of Two Climate Cases, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 110–11 (2011), 
available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/adler.html. 
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of challenging that decision.160 The Court declined to decide the state 
law claims, but hinted that the CAA may also preempt such 
claims.161 
The Court reduced the case to a single issue: displacement.162 The 
standing and political question issues received scant treatment from 
the Court. An equally divided Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s 
decision on standing.163 Justice Ginsburg noted that four of the 
justices believed at least some of the plaintiffs to have Article III 
standing under Massachusetts, while the other either distinguished 
the American Electric and Massachusetts cases or adhered to their 
dissenting opinions from Massachusetts.164 Justice Ginsburg did not 
discuss the Second Circuit’s analysis on standing, nor did she provide 
any further guidance.165 
After briefly setting up the issues of the political question doctrine 
and whether plaintiffs had indeed stated a claim under federal 
common law for the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions, Justice 
Ginsburg rendered the points moot. Calling the issues an “academic 
question,” the Court held that the CAA and the EPA actions it 
authorizes displace any such claims.166 Finally, Justice Ginsburg 
suggested that while such complex scientific determinations were 
best left to expert agencies like the EPA, as opposed to “ad hoc, case-
by-case injunctions” issued by district court judges,167 the agency’s 
decisions would be subject to review in regulatory challenges.168 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2538–39. Justice Ginsburg went on to explain that Federal courts 
would still have the power to review the EPA’s decision, if challenged, to determine if the decision was 
arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 2539. 
 161. Id. at 2540. The Court noted that neither party had briefed the Court on the state law claims. Id. 
 162. Before reaching that holding though, Justice Ginsburg first noted that the EPA was regulating 
greenhouse gases in response to Massachusetts v. EPA. Id. at 2533. The Court pointed to several steps 
the EPA and federal government were taking to regulate the gases: the EPA issued the Endangerment 
and Cause or Contribute findings; the EPA and the Department of Transportation issued a final rule 
regulating emissions from light-duty vehicles; the EPA set requirements for major stationary emitters to 
use the best available control technology; and the EPA had begun rulemaking to set limits on 
greenhouse gas emissions from major emitters and was committed to issuing a final ruling by May 
2012. Id. 
 163. Id. at 2535. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the decision. Id. at 2540. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 2535. 
 166. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2537. 
 167. Id. at 2539. This opinion was contrary to the Second Circuit’s opinion that district court judges 
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B. Displacing A Nuisance: Analyzing The American Electric 
Decision 
1. Displacing Connecticut Through Milwaukee II 
On the issue of displacement, the American Electric Court 
registered a unanimous vote.169 The Court took particular guidance 
from Milwaukee II, noting displacement turns only on whether 
Congress has occupied the field in question, “not whether it has been 
occupied in a particular manner.”170 Yet Justice Rehnquist, in 
authoring the Milwaukee II opinion, was clear that Congress had 
occupied the field of water pollution “through the establishment of a 
comprehensive regulatory program.”171 Justice Rehnquist went 
further in that case, noting that the CWA did more than merely speak 
to the issue of interstate water pollution.172 He wrote that the 
Amendments to the Act, coming after Milwaukee I, represented a 
“total restructuring” and “complete rewriting” of existing water 
pollution laws.173 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that Congress—in 
creating such a “self-consciously comprehensive” regulatory system 
for water pollution—left no room for federal common law to fill in 
the gaps.174 Thus, when the Milwaukee II Court noted the question 
was not “whether [the field] has been occupied in a particular 
manner,” Justice Rehnquist was referring to specific permitting and 
                                                                                                                 
routinely deal with complex scientific issues when they relate to federal common law claims. 
Connecticut II, 582 F.3d 309, 329 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 
2527 (2011). 
 168. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2539. In noting that the EPA’s decisions would not “escape 
judicial review,” Justice Ginsburg clarified the decisions would not stand if they were “arbitrary, 
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.” Id. Despite this being a notoriously low standard for agencies to 
meet, it is interesting that the EPA failed to meet the standard in Massachusetts. See Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007). 
 169. The vote was 8-0, as Justice Sotomayor did not participate. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2540. 
Justice Alito filed a short separate opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, which concurred in part and 
concurred in the judgment. Id. at 2540–41 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 170. Id. at 2538 (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 324 (1981)). 
 171. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317. 
 172. Id. Indeed, Rehnquist pointed out the Federal Water Pollution Control Act before the 1972 
amendments were “inadequate to supplant federal common law.” Id. 
 173. Id. The Milwaukee II Court further asserted that the CWA represented congressional intent to 
create an exhaustive and comprehensive regime of water pollution regulation. Id. at 318. 
 174. Id. at 319. 
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regulating decisions made within an already comprehensive 
regulatory regime.175 
It is not clear whether the CAA represents the same sort of 
comprehensive regulatory regime as the CWA. Whereas Congress 
completely rewrote interstate water pollution laws with the CWA,176 
it has taken no such actions regarding global warming.177 The EPA 
was forced into considering regulation of greenhouse gases in the 
first instance.178 As noted by Justice Ginsburg, the EPA did respond, 
putting in place initial measures to address greenhouse gas 
emissions179 and proposing to release limits for electrical generating 
units (EGUs)180 in May 2012.181 The CWA, on the other hand, 
requires permits for every point source of water pollution.182 
Dismissing that argument, the American Electric Court essentially 
determined that Milwaukee II stood for the proposition that any 
regulatory regime would suffice.183 It is hard to argue, though, that 
the CAA and the EPA do not comprehensively regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions from fossil-fuel-fired power plants, and such a narrow 
reading is sufficient to justify the outcome of the case.184 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Id. at 324. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist noted that the issue in question was the “nature of the 
problems, not the extent to which the problems have been addressed.” Id. at 323. 
 176. Id. at 317. 
 177. See Alex, supra note 15, at 82–84. 
 178. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (noting that the EPA acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in refusing to regulate greenhouse gases). 
 179. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2011); see also PSD Rule, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 82,536 (Dec. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52); Action to Ensure Authority to 
Implement Title V Permitting Programs Under the Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,254 
(Dec. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52 & 70); Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 
2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86 & 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537 & 538). 
 180. Proposed Settlement Agreement, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,392 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Dec. 30, 2010) 
(notice). 
 181. Id. (“Under the proposed settlement agreement EPA will take final action with respect to the 
proposed rule no later than May 26, 2012.”). 
 182. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006) (“Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316, 
1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be 
unlawful.”) (emphasis added). A point source is “any discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance . . . from which pollutants are . . . discharged.” Id. § 1362(14). 
 183. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2538 (“Congress selects different regulatory regimes to address 
different problems.”). 
 184. Professor Adler asserts that the Court’s decision was clear, as the plaintiffs’ claims would 
certainly be displaced “if the CAA’s expansive statutory scheme was to apply to GHGs . . . .” Adler, 
supra note 159, at 110–11. He further asserts that the language of Milwaukee II clearly states that the 
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Yet a broader reading of the case suggests that climate change 
itself needs a comprehensive regulatory regime into which 
contributions from greenhouse gas emissions from electric utilities 
would fall.185 When Justice Ginsburg opines that courts are not suited 
to handle global warming nuisance claims through “ad hoc, case-by-
case injunctions” due to the magnitude and complexity of the 
issue,186 she demonstrates why the CAA does not occupy the entire 
field of climate change mitigation: climate change is a problem of a 
magnitude greater than any contemplated by the CAA. The first 
purpose of the Act is “to protect and enhance the quality of the 
Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and 
welfare,”187 yet the emissions of greenhouse gases do more than just 
degrade air resources. Ocean acidification, for instance, is another 
nasty consequence of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases.188 While the CAA does include effects to water as a part of the 
public welfare,189 the Act is limited to the public welfare of the 
United States population.190 The world’s oceans do not belong to the 
United States, and failing to address that aspect of emissions could 
lead to retaliation from other nations. Further, the Act only addresses 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, and not 
deforestation—the other major driver of climate change.191 
Therefore, American Electric would not bar a federal common law 
nuisance claim against companies who contribute to deforestation. 
The Court correctly found that—in the narrow circumstances 
                                                                                                                 
question is not “whether the field has been occupied . . . in a particular manner.” Id. at 111. 
 185. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 512 (2007) (arguing that “climate change had its own 
‘political history’” and that Congress did not intend the CAA to apply to international atmospheric 
deposits). This was one of EPA’s arguments in Massachusetts. Id. 
 186. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2539–40 (noting that expert agencies are better suited to dealing 
with “issues of this order”). 
 187. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1). 
 188. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 36 (noting that the CO2 content of the oceans have risen by 
about 100 gigatons since the beginning of the industrial revolution). This acidification threatens marine 
life, and could be particularly threatening to coral reefs. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH 
PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 151–52. 
 189. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h). 
 190. Id. § 7401(b)(1) (noting that the Act seeks to protect the “Nation’s . . . population”). 
 191. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 14 (noting that deforestation 
accounts for about 20% of anthropogenic contributions to atmospheric greenhouse-gas levels). 
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presented by the case—the CAA displaces federal common law 
claims of nuisance.192 Unfortunately for both advocates of climate 
change action and the population at-large, global warming is not 
confined to those circumstances. 
2. Paralysis by [Lack of] Analysis 
The Supreme Court’s decision in American Electric fails to answer 
some questions posed by climate change litigation while 
simultaneously creating others. The decision regarding displacement 
was fairly straightforward and clear,193 but there was a distinct lack 
of analysis regarding the other issues of the case.194 
a. Abating Monetary Claims? 
The Court effectively eliminated federal common law nuisance 
claims against electric utilities in the fight against global warming,195 
at least in cases where injunctive relief is the desired result.196 It is 
hard to see how any plaintiff would survive a similar displacement 
analysis in bringing a federal claim for money damages. Indeed, in 
September 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that 
American Electric’s holding applied to damages cases.197 In 
                                                                                                                 
 192. See Adler, supra note 159, at 110–11. 
 193. Id. (noting that the Justices were in complete agreement on the issue of displacement and that the 
“clear language” of Milwaukee II demanded such a finding). 
 194. See Daniel A. Farber, Standing on Hot Air: American Electric Power and the Bankruptcy of 
Standing Doctrine, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 121, 121 (2011), available at 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/farber.html (noting that the Court “devoted only a few cryptic 
sentences” to discussing standing); Hari M. Osofsky, AEP v. Connecticut’s Implications for the Future 
of Climate Change Litigation, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 101, 101 (2011), available at 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/osofsky.html (noting that the American Electric decision “largely 
sidesteps” several of the issues). 
 195. Maxine Burkett, Climate Justice and the Elusive Climate Tort, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 115, 117 
(2011), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/burkett.html (noting such claims are barred as 
long as the EPA has regulatory authority). 
 196. Michael B. Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 121 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 135, 135 (2011), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/gerrard.html (suggesting 
federal common law claims for money damages may still survive). Indeed, the American Electric case 
explicitly refers to claims seeking injunctive relief throughout the opinion, referring to the “common law 
right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions” and claims seeking “curtailment of greenhouse gas 
emissions.” Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011). 
 197. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2012) (“AEP 
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affirming the lower court’s decision in Kivalina, the Ninth Circuit 
held that “under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, if a cause of 
action is displaced, displacement is extended to all remedies.”198 
Whether the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is sound is beyond the scope 
of this article.199 
Yet it is difficult to see why the Supreme Court did not explicitly 
hold that the CAA preempted all federal common law claims of 
nuisance against electric utilities for greenhouse gas emissions.200 
Certainly, such a holding would have clarified the issue for future 
litigants. The Court, however, declined to even analyze whether the 
plaintiffs properly stated federal common law claims.201 While 
Justice Ginsburg dismissed the issue as an “academic question,”202 it 
is quite likely that a litigant or enterprising attorney will make it a 
practical reality, wasting judicial resources on an issue that could 
have been settled. 
b. The State of State Claims 
The Court did not rule on the state law claims of nuisance.203 
Traditionally, the Court is less willing to find preemption of state law 
by the federal government, requiring a finding of a manifest 
congressional intent to preempt the state law.204 By failing to address 
                                                                                                                 
extinguished Kivalina’s federal common law public nuisance damage action, along with the federal 
common law public nuisance abatement actions.”). 
 198. Id. 
 199. In reaching its holding, the Ninth Circuit relied on prior Supreme Court decisions in Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008), and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea 
Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). Id. The concurring opinion, however, noted that there was 
“tension in Supreme Court authority on whether displacement of a claim for injunctive relief necessarily 
calls for displacement of a damages claim.” Id. at 858 (Pro, J., concurring). 
 200. The Court wrote “that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law.” Am. Elec. Power, 131 
S. Ct. at 2540. This was surprisingly vague language by the Court. Read in context, it might suggest that 
the CAA displaces all federal common law nuisance claims relating to greenhouse gases emitted by 
power plants. It almost certainly does not mean that the CAA now displaces all federal common law. As 
it is unclear, this holding cannot serve as a definitive displacement to anything but federal common law 
claims seeking abatement or injunctive relief against greenhouse gas emitters. 
 201. Id. at 2537. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 2540 (noting that the state law claims had not been briefed). 
 204. See id. at 2537; Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008); Adler, supra note 159, at 112 
(noting more than a federal act is required to preempt state law). 
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the issue, the Court again guarantees that courts will hear state law 
claims for the abatement of greenhouse gases.205 In Georgia, for 
instance, a plaintiff might bring a nuisance suit under terms that are 
more favorable to plaintiffs than federal nuisance claims.206 
Theoretically, certain states might become hotspots of global 
warming nuisance suits.207 Consequently, companies may face the 
prospect of multiple suits in various states with no certainty of a 
single outcome.208 Without proper briefing, however, the Court was 
in no position to decide the issue, and properly remanded the 
remaining claims.209 
c. Splitting on Standing 
The Court’s equally divided affirmation of the Second Circuit’s 
opinion on jurisdiction did little to clarify the issue of standing in 
climate change litigation cases.210 Justice Ginsburg wrote that the 
dissenters on this issue either distinguished American Electric from 
Massachusetts v. EPA or simply adhered to their dissents from that 
case.211 Unfortunately, this murky approach does little to inform 
future litigants. Were new plaintiffs to reach the Supreme Court—
perhaps seeking monetary damages in a state law claim—would 
those dissenting Justices again distinguish the case from 
Massachusetts v. EPA, or simply decide they did not wish to follow 
the precedent they had previously set? Indeed, Justice Ginsburg’s 
                                                                                                                 
 205. See Osofsky, supra note 194, at 103 (finding that American Electric does not affect the “large 
number” of state law claims challenging power plants emissions of greenhouse gases). 
 206. Georgia statutory law describes a nuisance as “anything that causes hurt, inconvenience, or 
damage to another” so long as the inconvenience would affect an “ordinary, reasonable man.” O.C.G.A. 
§ 41-1-1 (2012). The Restatement, contrastingly, requires an “unreasonable interference” with rights. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979). A common-sense analysis would indicate that the 
former is a lower threshold to meet than the latter, and knowing that federal claims are now barred, 
litigants might be encouraged to bring their claims to the state courts. 
 207. Delaware, known for its flexible corporate law, is the most prominent state for corporate 
lawsuits. Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in 
Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 60 (2009) (noting “Delaware’s preeminence in corporate law”). 
Could a similar situation emerge in climate change litigation law? 
 208. See supra text accompanying notes 205–07. 
 209. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2540. 
 210. Farber, supra note 194, at 122 (noting that the court’s decision left the reasoning of individual 
justices “mysterious”). 
 211. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2535. 
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subtle jab at the dissenting Justices hints that political ideology may 
have been a factor.212 Additionally, it is unclear how the holding 
affects the standing of private plaintiffs in future climate change 
litigation suits.213 
3. Scientific Complexity or Political Uncertainty?: Dicta as 
Distortion 
a. Every Breath You Take . . . Could Lead to Federal Lawsuits 
Perhaps the most disappointing aspects of the American Electric 
decision were the dicta that seem to question the importance of action 
on anthropogenic global warming.214 While the Court in 
Massachusetts v. EPA noted “[t]he harms associated with climate 
change are serious and well recognized,”215 the Court in American 
Electric, in comparing the CAA to the CWA, noted “Congress could 
hardly preemptively prohibit every discharge of carbon dioxide” as 
humans emit carbon dioxide “merely by breathing.”216 This dictum 
gives credence to the slippery-slope argument, suggesting that 
greenhouse gas emissions are different from water pollution and 
                                                                                                                 
 212. Farber, supra note 194, at 122 (noting the ideological nature of Article III standing and that the 
conservative Justices did not find standing in Massachusetts v. EPA). Professor Farber interprets the 
American Electric opinion as indicating that the dissenting Justices from Massachusetts v. EPA simply 
“held their ground.” Id. 
 213. Compare Osofsky, supra note 194, at 103 (noting the American Electric decision does not 
clarify whether nongovernmental entities or persons acting alone have standing to bring claims), with 
Environmental Law and Climate Change Community Podcast: Steve Jones Discusses American Electric 
Power Co. v. Connecticut, LEXISNEXIS COMMUNITIES (Aug. 8, 2011, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/environmental-climatechangelaw/blogs/climatechange/archive 
/2012/10/17/lexisnexis_ae00_-environmental-law-and-climate-change-community-podcast_3a00_-
steve-jones-on-american-electric-power-co.-v.-connecticut.aspx (claiming that state, city, and private 
plaintiffs all have standing to bring claims). 
 214. See Burkett, supra note 195, at 118 (noting that the Court took “time in its relatively slender 
decision to inject doubt about elements of climate science”). 
 215. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007) (noting that the EPA itself relied on an 
“objective and independent assessment” that pointed to the numerous significant harms resulting from 
global warming) (quoting Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 
52,930 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Sept. 8, 2003) (notice))). 
 216. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2538. This argument fails to recognize that humans also emit 
effluent wastes merely through their use of the restroom, yet the CWA still manages to prohibit the 
“discharge of any pollutant” unless the polluter obtains a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006). 
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could subject every citizen and small business to lawsuits.217 Indeed, 
one amicus brief for the petitioners suggested that an affirmative 
ruling by the Court would “permit literally anyone alleging climate-
change based damages to sue any entity or natural person in the 
world.”218 
While the slippery-slope argument is alluring, it is faulty and 
unnecessary. Taking the extreme example of a lawsuit based on a 
person breathing, basic principles of causation would likely prevent 
such non-meritorious claims from succeeding. Quite simply, 
breathing, by its very nature, cannot contribute to the anthropogenic 
global warming; indeed, human emissions of carbon dioxide—
generated by breathing—are part of a closed-loop cycle.219 
While human breathing may not become a source of litigation, 
there is some merit in the fears that a judicial affirmation in American 
Electric might have subjected small businesses to suits for their 
emissions.220 But, the Court needed only look at the CAA itself and 
its definitional limits for “major stationary source[s]” to see that 
setting reasonable limits is quite feasible.221 
The Court also reasoned that district courts are simply not capable 
of imposing injunctions on an “ad hoc, case-by-case” basis,222 or that 
                                                                                                                 
 217. The amicus brief of the United States Chamber of Commerce depicts suits that “will destabilize 
our economy, undermine our democratic process, and impact sensitive foreign policy consideration.” 
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in Support of 
Petitioners at 5–6, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 10-174), 2011 WL 
396512 at *5. 
 218. Id. at 5. 
 219. Frequently Asked Global Change Questions, CARBON DIOXIDE INFO. ANALYSIS CENTER, 
http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/faq.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). All the carbon in the human body comes 
from plants, either that we eat, or that the animals we eat ate. Does Breathing Contribute to CO2 
Buildup in the Atmosphere?, SKEPTICAL SCI., http://www.skepticalscience.com/breathing-co2-carbon-
dioxide-intermediate.htm (last updated Sept. 26, 2010). Those plants recently absorbed carbon dioxide 
from the atmosphere, thus forming the cycle with human breathing. Id. 
 220. In Massachusetts v. EPA, for instance, Massachusetts pled injuries that were fairly de minimis at 
the time. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521–23, 526 (noting only 10–20 centimeters of global sea 
level rise and that the risk of catastrophic harm to the State was “remote”). A crafty lawyer could easily 
argue that if such de minimis impacts were sufficient to create an actionable injury, certainly any small 
business’s contribution to global greenhouse gas levels would be enough to warrant judicial action. 
 221. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j) (“[T]he terms ‘major stationary source’ and ‘major emitting facility’ mean 
any stationary facility or source of air pollutants which directly emits, or has the potential to emit, one 
hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant.”). 
 222. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2539. This opinion was contrary to the Second Circuit’s opinion 
that district court judges routinely deal with complex scientific issues when they relate to federal 
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such injunctions would invariably lead to inequalities. Yet the courts 
already hear cases based on complex scientific issues223—including 
both products liability and nuisance claims—and it is possible that 
decisions or settlements in climate change nuisance cases would 
force Congress to speak directly on the issue with a new Act or 
amendments, as they did after Milwaukee I.224 
The decision in Massachusetts v. EPA essentially ensured that 
claims like those brought in American Electric would not survive.225 
The Court reasoned properly that the CAA, in light of the decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, preempted federal common law claims 
seeking abatement of greenhouse gas emissions from fossil-fuel-fired 
power plants.226 Justice Ginsburg’s dictum serves only to give 
ammunition to future litigants in climate change litigation not 
preempted by American Electric. 
b. The Court as Climatologist? 
Justice Ginsburg’s dicta also indicated that judges may not 
“commission scientific studies or convene groups of experts for 
advice.”227 This implies two things: first, federal courts are not 
competent to handle complex scientific issues; and second, that 
courts would need to commission more research on climate change 
before competently deciding climate change cases. As to the first, 
courts frequently make decisions based on studies and testimony of 
experts.228 The Court declared the need for trial courts to handle 
                                                                                                                 
common law claims. Connecticut II, 582 F.3d 309, 328–29 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 
(2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
 223. Connecticut II, 582 F.3d at 329. 
 224. As Justice Rehnquist notes in Milwaukee II, after Milwaukee I Congress completely restructured 
water pollution laws within the United States. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981). 
 225. Adler, supra note 159, at 109–10 (noting that many of the same litigants were involved in both 
the Massachusetts v. EPA and American Electric cases, and that the decision in Massachusetts v. EPA 
“all but assured” the decision in American Electric). 
 226. Id. at 110–11 (noting that the Second Circuit ignored the clear reasoning of Milwaukee II 
requiring only legislative action, and that the relevant question was not the manner in which Congress 
occupied the field, but only if it had occupied the field). 
 227. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2540. 
 228. The Supreme Court, in determining that carbon dioxide was a pollutant under CAA definitions in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, relied heavily on the testimony of climatologist Michael MacCracken. See 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521–25 (2007). 
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complex scientific issues—in Daubert v. Merrill Dow 
Pharmaceuticals—when it established that a trial court judge “must 
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence” is both 
relevant and reliable.229 While the Daubert standard is not used in 
administrative challenges like Massachusetts v. EPA,230 it exists 
precisely to allow judges to act as gatekeepers against poor scientific 
evidence.231 
Despite the second implication of Justice Ginsburg’s comment, 
courts do not need to commission new studies on climate change to 
decide climate change cases. First, it is not the courts’ job to create 
new scientific data, but rather to exercise gatekeeping duties and only 
admit “[p]ertinent evidence based on scientifically valid 
principles.”232 Second, should the courts need more clarity on any 
particular area of the science, there are almost certainly studies 
dealing with the issue.233 In Daubert, Justice Blackmun asserted the 
Court should be more optimistic in the capabilities of juries to wade 
through scientific evidence.234 The Court should likewise exhibit the 
same confidence in district courts to handle cases dealing with 
complex scientific material. 
                                                                                                                 
 229. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). 
 230. Ryan Hackney, Note, Flipping Daubert: Putting Climate Change Defendants in the Hot Seat, 40 
ENVTL. L. 255, 260 (2010) (noting that neither Daubert nor the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to 
administrative law cases). 
 231. Id. at 264–65 (noting Daubert’s two-prong test for admitting scientific evidence). 
 232. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. 
 233. The history underpinning the science of climate change—and humanity’s role in it—stretches 
back as far as 1824, when Joseph Fourier first noted that “atmospheric gases trap heat, raising the 
surface temperature” of the earth. POWELL, supra note 20, at 36. There are hundreds of studies published 
just in the few years since the cutoff to the fourth IPCC assessment. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 5. 
This is not to imply that climate science is settled on every issue; there are many areas of uncertainty left 
in the field of climate science that require more research. See BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 73, at 72–73 
(noting both “robust findings” and “key uncertainties” in climate science). Nevertheless, the climate-
science community is confident that the climate is changing and that human emissions of greenhouse 
gases constitute the major cause. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 12. Even 
with uncertainties, it is clear humanity faces grave consequences if we do not significantly reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 73, at 65, 72–73 (“Adaptation is necessary 
both in the short term and longer term to address impacts resulting from the warming that would occur 
even for the lowest stabilisation scenarios assessed. . . . Unmitigated climate change would, in the long 
term, be likely to exceed the capacity of natural, managed and human systems to adapt.”); U.S. GLOBAL 
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 12. There is enough science for courts to make 
decisions on climate change litigation. 
 234. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. 
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While the Court was correct that the CAA displaced federal 
common law claims seeking abatement of greenhouse gas emissions 
from fossil-fueled-fired power plants, it incorrectly asserted that 
absent such displacement, district courts have neither the knowledge 
base nor the ability to hear such claims. With its distracting decision, 
the Court clarified only that federal common law nuisance claims for 
abatement of emissions by fossil-fuel-fired power plants are 
preempted by federal law. Litigants, lawyers, and legislators are left 
to determine the best path forward in the fight against catastrophic 
climate change, and the role the courts will have in that fight. 
III. AMERICAN ECLECTIC: USING ALL LITIGATION OPTIONS IN THE 
FIGHT AGAINST GLOBAL WARMING 
While the decision in American Electric answered few questions, 
the Court was clear that expert agencies under the authority of the 
federal government are in the best position to address global 
warming.235 Nevertheless, the current regulatory system is inadequate 
to handle climate change,236 and until Congress speaks directly on 
climate change in toto with new legislation, states and advocates will 
continue to initiate climate change litigation. Climate change 
advocates, including states, face two questions: what litigation 
options are still available, and is litigation still an effective means of 
effectuating change in light of the EPA’s authority to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions? The answers are fairly simple: many 
litigation options are available, and advocates must use all of those 
litigation options in the fight against climate change. 
A. Litigation Options 
American Electric removed one arrow from the litigation quiver of 
climate change advocates—federal common law nuisance claims 
                                                                                                                 
 235. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2011). 
 236. For instance, the CAA does not address global warming contributions from deforestation, nor 
from stationary sources that do not qualify as major. It does not provide a means for moving citizens 
whose land is lost from climate change, as in Kivalina, nor does it provide a means of recovery for 
private citizens who have lost their land, their homes, or their lives from climate change. 
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seeking abatement of greenhouse gas emissions from fossil-fuel-fired 
power plants.237 The American Electric dicta suggest that other forms 
of climate change litigation would suffer the same fate upon reaching 
the Court.238 Yet by failing to explicitly rule on anything other than 
the narrow issue, the Court left the door open for many forms of 
climate change litigation. 
Commentators have suggested various approaches to climate 
change litigation.239 Nuisance still remains an option in state law 
claims240 and potentially in federal common law claims seeking 
damages as opposed to abatement,241 though the Court’s opinion in 
American Electric suggests that the judicial system is not suited to 
handle such claims.242 Tort law also provides other avenues of 
litigation potentially available to litigants, including claims for 
misrepresentation, fraud, and product liability.243 
The tobacco industry lawsuits of the 1990s may provide guidance 
to climate change litigants in tort suits. Some commentators suggest 
using the tobacco litigation as a model for litigation against oil and 
car companies for health dangers related to their pollutions,244 and a 
                                                                                                                 
 237. See Burkett, supra note 195, at 115. 
 238. Indeed, much of the dicta indicate that the climate change issues are too large and complex for 
the judiciary. See Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2539–40. 
 239. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State 
Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 781 (2010) (using public trust doctrines in 
“adaptive management-based climate change adaptation regimes”); David A. Grossman, Warming Up to 
a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003) 
(developing various tort theories of climate change litigation); Angela Lipanovich, Comment, Smoke 
Before Oil: Modeling a Suit Against the Auto and Oil Industry on the Tobacco Tort Litigation is 
Feasible, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 429 (2005) (using tobacco tort litigation as a model for suits 
against the auto and oil companies). 
 240. Adler, supra note 159, at 112. 
 241. Gerrard, supra note 196, at 135 (suggesting that federal common law claims for money damages 
may still survive). The litigation begun in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil is pending review in 
the Ninth Circuit, and may provide further guidance. See Burkett, supra note 195, at 116. The Ninth 
Circuit will thus have a chance to decide whether the CAA also preempts federal common law claims of 
nuisance seeking damages, among the other issues the case presents. For a discussion of the case, see 
supra Part I.C.1.c. 
 242. Adler, supra note 159, at 112 (noting that the American Electric decision could “chill” state 
based nuisance claims). 
 243. See Grossman, supra note 239, at 39. But see Donald G. Gifford, Climate Change and the Public 
Law Model of Torts: Reinvigorating Judicial Restraint Doctrines, 62 S.C. L. REV. 201, 204 (2010) 
(noting that the tort model is the “wrong tool”). 
 244. See generally Lipanovich, supra note 239, at 429. But see Thomas A. Donovan, Litigation: An 
Antidote for Democracy, FED. LAW., Feb. 2007, at 8, 9, 28 (arguing that tobacco litigation is not a valid 
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similar strategy may be used in the climate change context. Critics 
have argued that the comparison of the tobacco and fossil fuel 
industries is not valid by noting that carbon dioxide itself is not 
harmful to humans, unlike tobacco smoke.245 It is unclear, however, 
that a substance must be inherently dangerous to humans to be the 
subject of litigation.246 Moreover, the comparison between the 
industries is one of form rather than substance. Both the fossil fuel 
and tobacco industries have the financial resources to extend 
litigation as long as possible.247 Further, both industries have sought 
to obfuscate the truth about the dangers of their products.248 If 
litigants can reach the discovery stage against major fossil fuel 
companies, they may be able to uncover documents similar to those 
resulting from tobacco litigation that clearly showed the tobacco 
companies knew their products were harmful.249 Indeed, some similar 
internal documents from fossil fuel companies have already been 
exposed.250 Companies may begin settling if more evidence of 
deliberate misinformation can be found. 
Finally, many federal statutes provide avenues of litigation relating 
to climate change. Citizen suits are available under the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA)251 and the CAA.252 While the National 
                                                                                                                 
comparison for global warming suits). 
 245. Donovan, supra note 244, at 9, 28 (“[C]arbon dioxide is an essential component of the basic food 
cycle by which green plants produce oxygen and sugars.”). Donovan also uses the same fallacious 
reasoning that led Justice Ginsburg to make her “merely by breathing” comment. Id. at 28 (“Every 
breath a human being takes produces carbon dioxide.”). 
 246. Water, for instance, is also a basic building block of animal and plant life, yet few would protest 
a landowner suing to stop another landowner from dumping thousands of gallons of water onto the first 
landowner’s property. 
 247. See Grossman, supra note 239, at 6 (noting both the tobacco and fossil fuel industries’ “ability to 
challenge everything” resulting from vast financial resources). 
 248. See generally ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 20 (discussing both the tactics and persons 
involved in creating doubt about the dangers of smoking and global warming). 
 249. To view documents unearthed in tobacco litigation, see generally TOBACCODOCUMENTS.ORG, 
http://tobaccodocuments.org (last visited July 19, 2012). Included among the documents is the infamous 
1969 “doubt is our product” memo that suggested using doubt to counter the body of facts linking 
smoking to cancer. Smoking and Health Proposal, TOBACCODOCUMENTS.ORG, supra. 
 250. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SMOKE, MIRRORS & HOT AIR: HOW EXXONMOBIL 
USES BIG TOBACCO’S TACTICS TO MANUFACTURE UNCERTAINTY ON CLIMATE SCIENCE 10 (2007), 
available at www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global_warming/exxon_report.pdf. 
 251. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006). See generally Lawrence Liebesman, Elizabeth Lake & Peter 
Landreth, The Endangered Species Act and Climate Change, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 
11173 (2009); Hanspeter Walter, Comment, The Outer Limits of Endangered Species Act Liability—the 
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Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) does not have a citizen suit 
provision, citizens can challenge compliance with NEPA under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).253 
Climate change litigants will have to address many of the issues 
the Court left undecided in American Electric. Discussing each of 
these issues in detail is beyond the scope of this Comment.254 It is 
fairly certain, however, that in any tort-related suits, the issues of 
standing and political question will continue to play a role. The 
purpose of the lawsuit, however, will likely dictate which type of 
claim a litigant chooses, and any claim—whether regulatory or for 
damages—may play a part in combating global warming. 
B. The Heat Goes On: Litigation As A Tool 
1. Monitoring Current Enforcement 
In light of the EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions and the Court’s decision in American Electric, global 
warming activists must ask themselves whether litigation is still a 
useful way to spur governmental action. Indeed, it may be that such 
litigation is becoming counterproductive. Is it time to “call off the 
dogs” and let the federal government work? The answer is a 
resounding no.255 Concerned advocates and states must continue to 
litigate climate change issues. 
                                                                                                                 
ESA’s Indirect Effect Regulation and Its Application to Climate Change, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10204 (2011). 
 252. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006). This section allows for citizen suits against any party for, inter alia, 
violating emissions standards, but not for recovery of damages. Id. § 7604(a). 
 253. 86 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 12 (2005). Under the APA, citizens may seek judicial review of 
agency decisions to determine if those decisions were arbitrary and capricious. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706(2); 
see also Amy L. Stein, Climate Change Under NEPA: Avoiding Cursory Consideration of Greenhouse 
Gases, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 473, 473 (2010) (arguing that while NEPA does not require consideration 
of climate change effects, “inclusion of climate change in NEPA documentation is inevitable”). 
 254. For more information on the issue of standing, see Farber, supra note 194, at 121. For more 
information on the political question doctrine as it applies to climate change litigation, see generally 
James R. May, AEP v. Connecticut and the Future of the Political Question Doctrine, 121 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 127 (2011), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/may.html. 
 255. But see David A. Dana, The Mismatch Between Public Nuisance Law and Global Warming, 18 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 9, 11–12 (2010) (noting that the common law courts are not the “appropriate 
institutions to address the problem of climate change”). 
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Climate change is an issue that requires action sooner rather than 
later.256 While the EPA, as an expert agency, may be in the best 
position to deal with the issue, as the American Electric Court 
suggests, it would be unwise for advocates to postpone litigation for 
two reasons: first, the EPA’s ability and authority to regulate 
greenhouse gases are subject to change; and second, even if the EPA 
regulates those emissions, the process may be delayed. The EPA, an 
administrative agency, is subject to policy changes with each new 
president.257 Future policy changes may undermine any regulatory 
action the EPA takes on greenhouse gas emissions.258 Moreover, the 
agency is subject to the whim of Congressional funding. Hostile 
Republican legislators in 2011 threatened the EPA’s ability to 
enforce any of its regulations.259 Congressional rhetoric portrays the 
agency as a job-killing behemoth.260 Precious time will be lost if 
advocates refrain from litigating the issue and Congress manages to 
limit or repeal the agency’s ability to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Even if Congressional threats to the EPA do not succeed, 
American Electric suggests that the EPA’s authority to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions displaces federal common law nuisance 
claims, even if the EPA refuses to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
from existing power plants.261 Delays in the rulemaking process 
                                                                                                                 
 256. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (“The turning point must come soon.”). 
 257. See Shahrzod Hanizavareh, Affirming the Status Quo? Regulating the National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards for Ozone, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 599, 604 (2009) (noting that it is difficult to determine 
what priorities the EPA will follow under a “new administration”). 
 258. See May, supra note 254, at 131 (noting that many 2012 presidential candidates “have made 
blocking EPA action on climate change a priority”). 
 259. See Lisa P. Jackson, Op-Ed, “Too Dirty to Fail”?: House Republicans’ Assault On Our 
Environmental Laws Must Be Stopped, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at A31, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/21/opinion/la-oe-jackson-train-act-20111021 (noting that 
Republicans in the 2011 House of Representatives have “averaged roughly a vote every day . . . to 
undermine the Environmental Protection Agency”). 
 260. See James Rosen, Regulation Nation: EPA Chief Rejects GOP Charges She’s Imposing Job-
Killing Rules, FOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/22/regulation 
-nation-epa-chief-rejects-gop-charges-shes-imposing-job-killing-rules/. 
 261. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538–39 (2011). Justice Ginsburg did note 
that an EPA decision not to issue regulations would be subject to judicial review, albeit on an arbitrary 
and capricious standard. Id. at 2539. 
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could postpone any actual regulation of those emissions.262 
Furthermore, the EPA’s authority to regulate and the regulations 
themselves are often challenged in court,263 which could lead to 
further delay in implementing new regulations. Thus, advocates must 
use litigation to put pressure on the EPA to ensure it complies with 
its duty to regulate greenhouse gases. That pressure should be shifted 
to fossil fuel companies if the EPA fails to issue regulations that are 
sufficient to make an impact on global warming. 
2. Turning Up the Heat on Congress: Litigating to Legislate 
The only solution to anthropogenic global warming is a concerted 
global effort.264 Such an effort cannot succeed without the leadership, 
or at least support, of the United States.265 Real change in the United 
States requires comprehensive legislation that covers all facets of 
global warming: greenhouse gas emissions, land use, efficiency, and 
sustainable growth. In addition to maximizing time until the EPA 
either issues regulations or is prevented from doing so by Congress, 
litigation advances the goal of such comprehensive legislation in 
three ways. 
First, litigation keeps the pressure on fossil fuel companies and 
other large emitters. Comprehensive legislation is a near 
impossibility as long as the largest contributors to global greenhouse 
gas emissions are able to exert powerful control over the nation’s 
                                                                                                                 
 262. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) 
(No. 10-174), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-
174.pdf (noting that “[a] lot can happen to delay or derail” the EPA’s promise to issue EGU limits in 
May, 2012). 
 263. Indeed, the Tailoring Rule and Endangerment findings have already been challenged, and, 
thankfully, upheld. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113–14 (D.C. Cir. 
2012). For more information about this case, see generally Ayesha Rascoe & Jonathan Stempel, U.S. 
Court Upholds EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Rules: Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, WESTLAW 
J. ENVTL., July 3, 2012, at 1. 
 264. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (“To stabilize climate, a decarbonized global society—
with near-zero emissions of CO2 and other long-lived greenhouse gases—needs to be reached well 
within this century.”). 
 265. Bill Blakemore, U.N. Leader on Global Warming: We Need U.S. Leadership, ABC NEWS (Sept. 
24, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/GlobalWarming/story?id=3645491&page=1 (noting that 
China will not impose strict carbon emissions limits until the United States does, and that the United 
States “must set the example”). 
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energy policy and the climate change discussion.266 While the 
companies have the financial resources to battle in court, it is 
imperative that advocates and states make them do so. One need only 
look at the tobacco litigation of the 1960s through the 1990s to 
understand that success against a major industry is possible.267 Here, 
though, the stakes are even higher. The chances of obtaining a large-
scale settlement from the fossil fuel industry is likely smaller now 
that the Court has ruled that some federal common law nuisance 
claims are displaced, because lower courts may hold that nuisance 
claims for money damages are also displaced.268 However, advocates 
of climate change legislation should keep trying to obtain such a 
settlement through other tort remedies. A substantially damaging 
settlement may encourage fossil fuel companies to reposition their 
assets into more sustainable technologies to avoid more settlements, 
thus minimizing future emissions. Alternatively, if the fossil fuel 
companies feel threatened enough, they may begin to use their clout 
to persuade Congress to pass comprehensive legislation to protect 
their industry from such wide-ranging suits.269 
Second, litigation keeps the issue in the public consciousness 
during a time when the media is failing at its responsibilities to the 
public.270 The media’s coverage of climate change has been both 
inadequate and misleading.271 Indeed, some polls suggest Americans 
                                                                                                                 
 266. See Dan Froomkin, How the Oil Lobby Greases Washington’s Wheels, HUFFINGTON POST, 
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June 6, 2011, 6:12 AM) (noting the difficulty of repealing oil subsidies due to the influence of the oil 
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HOGGAN & LITTLEMORE, supra note 20, at ch. 13. 
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companies finally were required to pay out massive settlements). 
 268. See, e.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 
Adler, supra note 159, at 112 (noting other nuisance claims may be “chilled”). 
 269. There is obviously no guarantee that comprehensive legislation crafted in response to fossil fuel 
industry lobbying would achieve the goals of climate change advocates. Indeed, such legislation could 
produce results that prevent positive results in slowing or halting climate change. It would, however, 
provide more certainty for litigants and establish a framework in which advocates and states could 
operate. 
 270. See Joe Romm, The New York Times Asks “Where Did Global Warming Go?” While Ignoring 
Its Own Failed Coverage, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Oct. 16, 2011, 12:48 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/ 
romm/2011/10/16/345114/ny-times-asks-where-did-global-warming-go-while-ignoring-its-own-failed-
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 271. Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Behind the Curve: The National Media’s Reporting on 
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believe less in climate change now than just a few years ago.272 
Litigation, especially high-profile litigation, forces the issue into the 
public sphere, even though it may receive a negative connotation in 
the media. The more the public hears about the issue, the greater 
chance that people will demand their local and state politicians take 
action. 
Finally, litigation sends a clear message to Congress that simple 
appeasements will not suffice.273 Comprehensive legislation is 
needed—legislation that mandates consistently declining emissions 
levels while simultaneously propping up replacement sources of 
energy.274 Fill-in measures, like the EPA’s authority to regulate 
emissions from power plants, are not sufficient. Humans need 
energy, and there can be no doubt that we must strike a balance 
between energy needs and risks to the environment. Catastrophic 
climate change, however, is simply a risk that we cannot take; it 
overwhelms the short-term benefits we receive from the burning of 
fossil fuels.275 Advocates and states must demonstrate to Congress 
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 274. See supra note 264. 
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through continuing litigation that the issue is critical and that 
plaintiffs like those in Kivalina and Comer are suffering genuine 
losses that demand redress that current statutes do not currently 
provide. 
CONCLUSION 
American Electric proved less important for the precedent it set 
than for the questions it left unanswered. While courts wrestled over 
standing, the political question doctrine, and displacement in climate 
change nuisance cases in the years preceding American Electric, the 
Supreme Court relied only on the clear displacement path illuminated 
by its earlier decision in Massachusetts. While the decision in 
American Electric narrowed the litigation options that climate change 
advocates have at their disposal, it subtly sent a message to Congress 
that greater federal action is needed. In writing such a narrow ruling, 
Justice Ginsburg also sent a message to states and advocates—
whether intentionally or not—that climate change litigation is not 
dead. Until Congress enacts comprehensive climate change 
legislation, global warming lawsuits will, and must, continue. 
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